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1 Introduction
The novel field of quantum computation and quantum information has been
growing at a rapid rate; the study of quantum information in particular has led
to the emergence of communication and cryptographic protocols with no classi-
cal analogues. Quantum information protocols have interesting properties which
are not exhibited by their classical counterparts, but they are most distinguished
for their applications in cryptography. Notable results include the unconditional
security proof [1] of quantum key distribution. This result, in particular, is one
of the reasons for the widespread interest in this field. Furthermore, the imple-
mentation of quantum cryptography has been demonstrated in non-laboratory
settings and is already an important practical technology. Implementations of
quantum cryptography have already been commercially launched and tested by
a number of companies including MagiQ, Id Quantique, Toshiba, and NEC. The
unconditional security of quantum key distribution protocols does not automati-
cally imply the same degree of security for actual systems, of course; this justifies
the need for systems modelling and verification in this setting.
The benefits of automated verification techniques are well known for clas-
sical communication protocols, especially in the cryptographic setting. Our re-
search programme is to apply these techniques to quantum protocols with the
expectation of gaining corresponding benefits. Our earlier work involved apply-
ing probabilistic model–checking techniques to such protocols (see e.g. [2]; it
became clear that existing techniques are not satisfactory for analysing quan-
tum systems. Today, while simulation tools for quantum systems abound, to our
knowledge no other authors have developed a tool directly aimed at verifica-
tion. In this paper we describe just such a tool, named QMC (Quantum Model
Checker); it allows for automated verification of properties of quantum protocols.
Properties to be verified by QMC are expressed using the logic QCTL [3].QMC
enables the modelling of systems which can be expressed within the quantum
stabilizer formalism; such systems are known to be simulable in polynomial time
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(viz. Gottesman–Knill theorem [4]). The systems expressible in this formalism
are restricted, in the sense that the set of operations which they can perform is
not universal for quantum computation. Nevertheless, stabilizers are sufficient
to describe a number of systems of practical interest. We assume that the reader
has an understanding of the basics of quantum computation [5].
2 Tool Description
QMC is a command–line tool, implemented in Java 5, which simulates all pos-
sible executions of a quantum protocol model, and then checks that the model
satisfies any number of specification formulae supplied by the user. We will
now discuss the modelling language of QMC, the simulation of models, the
logic used for specifying properties, and the algorithms used for model–checking.
We will briefly discuss a concrete example, namely a model of quantum coin-
flipping [6], the QMC source for which is in the appendix, and is also available
at http://www.dcs.warwick.ac.uk/~nikos/downloads/case-study.qmc.
Modelling Language. Protocols are modelled using a high-level, concurrent pro-
gramming language developed especially for QMC. It is an imperative language
with lightweight concurrency, typed variables including channels, and commands
for allocating and manipulating the qubits in a global quantum state. Qubit vari-
ables are pointers to the individual quantum bits (qubits) in the global state.
The language has guarded commands, which are used to express looping and
nondeterministic choices.
QMC has a statically typed language, and variables of different types must
be declared at the beginning of a protocol model (shared variables), or at the
beginning of the process in which they are used (local variables). The classical
data types include integers (type integer), bits (type bool), and floating–point
numbers (type real). There is a channel type corresponding to each of these
base types (e.g. channel of integer). Qubit variables are references to qubits in
QMC’s internal quantum state. After declaration, these variables must be initial-
ized with the newqubit expression. A process can apply any one of the Clifford
group operators (see [5]): Hadamard (had), Controlled–not (cnot), Phase (ph)
to a given qubit, as well as perform quantum measurement with respect to the
computational basis. These are the operations allowed in the quantum stabilizer
formalism.
Simulating QMC programs. As in PROMELA, any command in QMC is either
executable or not from the current state. QMC’s process scheduler interleaves
executable statements from all process declarations in the input, resolving all
non–deterministic choices. Quantum measurement is also treated as a source of
non-determinism; a qubit in a general stabilizer state always produces one of
two possible outcomes with equal probability, and we treat these equiprobable
outcomes like a non–deterministic choice. Consequently, we do not analyse the
probabilities of different execution paths; this is an area for future work. The
scheduler ensures finiteness of models.We are currently developing an operational
semantics for the QMC language. Execution of a QMC program produces a tree
of execution paths, in which the branching arises from non–determinism.
Specification Logic. The properties of a given protocol model are expressed using
the logic QCTL [3], which is a temporal logic especially designed for reasoning
about quantum systems based on CTL [7]. This logic allows us to reason about
the evolution of the global quantum state as a given protocol model is executed.
It also enables reasoning about the states of classical variables and, hence, mea-
surement outcomes. The reader is referred to [3] for full details of the syntax
of the logic, which includes classical formulae (α = ⊥ | qb | α ⇒ α), terms
(t = x | (t + t) | (tt) | Re(|⊤〉A) | Im(|⊤〉A) | ∫ φ), quantum formulae (γ = (t ≤
t) | ⊥ | (α⊐α)) and temporal formulae (θ = γ | θ⊐ θ | (EXθ) | (E[θUθ]) | (AFθ)).
Interesting state formulas are those of the form
∫
φ ≤ a and [qbi, qbj ], where φ
is a base formula (e.g. ¬qb0) and qbi, qbj , qb0 are qubit variables. The first
formula states that, the probability of formula φ being satisfied in the current
state is less than or equal to a. The formula [qbi, qbj ] states that, in the current
state, the qubits corresponding to the variables qbi and qbj are not entangled
with the rest of the quantum system. In order to evaluate such a formula, QMC
analyses the entanglement of the current quantum state.
Verification Algorithms. QMC implements algorithms for evaluating EQPL for-
mulas over stabilizer states, which are represented internally using a matrix
representation (see [8]). In order to check the truth of a particular formula, its
truth needs to be determined for all possible valuations; the tool automatically
extracts all valuations from the internal representation. More interestingly, the
tool has been designed to explore all possible executions of a particular proto-
col arising from different measurement outcomes and non–deterministic choices.
Entanglement formulae may be checked without converting the internal repre-
sentation to the set of all valuations. In fact, it is possible to determine whether
a list of qubits qi, qi+1, . . . constitutes a partition of the global quantum state at
any point during execution using the entanglement normal forms developed by
Audenaert and Plenio [9]. Temporal formulae are checked by traversing the tree
produced by the execution of a protocol model.
An Example. We have built a QMCmodel for the quantum coin–flipping protocol
due to Bennett and Brassard [6] which is available online at the URL mentioned
at the beginning of Section 2. Quantum coin–flipping enables two users, Alice and
Bob, to establish a common random bit x through the transmission of a single
qubit q and its measurement. The protocol relies on the principle that, if Alice
and Bob use compatible bases for preparation and for measurement of this qubit,
their bit values will be guaranteed to match by the laws of quantum mechanics.
Incompatible bases will produce a matching bit value only with probability 1
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although in this case the protocol is repeated and the bit discarded. There are
various possible attacks that may be performed by an enemy, which would enable
him or her to compromise the final bit value. It is such attacks that we would
like to investigate using the QMC tool on this and related quantum protocols.
The basic property which needs to be checked at the end of the protocol is that
the bit values of Alice and Bob do indeed match, and this is only true if the
measurement basis bˆ chosen by Bob matches the preparation basis b of Alice.
Also, if Alice’s and Bob’s bits and bases are in agreement, the protocol should
not abort; this is expressed as a temporal property.
3 Conclusion and Future Work
We have described QMC, a model-checking tool for quantum protocols. As far
as we know, it is the first dedicated verification tool (as opposed to simula-
tion systems) for quantum protocols. QMC allows the modelling and verification
of properties of protocols expressible in the quantum stabilizer formalism. The
logic for expressing properties is QCTL. We have considered a simple exam-
ple illustrating the input language of the tool. It is significant to note that the
restriction to quantum stabilizer states allows QMC to simulate protocols effi-
ciently, although it limits the expressive power of the tool. There are protocols
which involve quantum states that fall outside the scope of the stabilizer for-
malism, and we are currently investigating ways of approximating such states
using techniques due to Bravyi and Kitaev [10]. Using such techniques it will be
possible to obtain an implementation which is powerful enough for the analysis
of general quantum protocols and the detection of potential flaws in their design.
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Appendix:
QMC Model of the Quantum Coin-Flipping Protocol
program QuantumCoinFlipping; var AtoB, BtoA: channel of qubit;
A2B, B2A: channel of bool;
process Alice ; var x, b, g, result : bool; q: qubit; begin
q := newqubit;
{Choose one of the four BB84 states and prepare qubit q}
if
 true →x:=false ; b:=false ;
 true →x:=false ; b:=true; had q;
 true →x:=true; b:=false ; X q;
 true →x:=true; b:=true; X q; had q;
fi
AtoB!q;
B2A?g;
A2B!b;
A2B!x;
result := ((not (b and g)) and (b or g));
end;
process Bob; var g, x hat , b hat, x, b, result : bool; rq : qubit;
abort : bool; {Bob aborts the protocol}
dontknow: bool; {Bob cannot determine Alice’ s honesty}
begin
AtoB?rq;
if
 true →g:=false; B2A!g;
 true →g:=true; B2A!g;
fi
{Select random measurement basis and measure}
if
 true →b hat:=false ;
 true →b hat:=true; had rq;
fi
x hat:=meas rq;
{Receive original b and x}
A2B?b;
A2B?x;
{Compare bases and bits}
if
 ((b=b hat) and (not (x=x hat))) →abort:=true;
 (not (b=b hat)) →dontknow:=true;
fi
result := ((not (b and g)) and (b or g));
end;
endprogram.
finalstateproperty (Alice . result == Bob.result);
property (AG (((b==b hat) and (x==x hat)) imp (abort==false)))
